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In a recent paper, "Nietzsche's Sting And The Possibility of Good 
Philology/1 Kenneth Wcstphal presents a case for interpreting as strongly 
cognitivist a number of Nietzsche's remarks concerning truth, language and 
the world. The cognitivism Wcstphal attributes to Nietzsche is at bottom 
a correspondence theory of truth: that there arc truths about the world 
that can be known and expressed, truth being a product of a correspondence 
between one's beliefs and the world.2 Wcstphal argued in an earlier 
paper3 that it is crucial to Nietzsche's enterprise that he maintain such a 
position, for unless he docs he cannot claim to know the facts upon which he 
bases his stinging criticisms of the Western intellectual tradition. For 
example, if Nietzsche cannot claim that Christians exist or have existed, 
and that they possess certain intelligible psychological features, and that 
it is possible to know what these features arc and to criticize them, then 
Nietzsche's own depiction of Christians as world-weary intellectually 
dishonest decadents is groundless. As Wcstphal puts it, "not interpreting 
him as a cognitivist-at least for a certain range of critical claims-converts 
the roaring lion into a noisy crank with no grasp of what's going on around 
him."4 
Wcstphal believes that in order to salvage the integrity of 
Nietzsche's critical project by providing that project an epistemic ground 
attributable to Nietzsche, a formidable obstacle must be overcome, namclv 
Nietzsche's own skeptical remarks. As Wcstphal asks, "How can 
Nietzsche be a cognitivist given his skeptical declamations, his criticisms 
of language, and his pcrspectivism?"5 According to Wcstphal, a convincing 
case for Nietzschcan cognitivism must not only provide evidence for 
establishing an epistcmology that is cognitivist, it must also reconcile 
Nietzsche's skeptical remarks to this epistcmology. A position that 
simultaneously implied the impossibility of truth and yet advocated the 
• Kenneth Wcstphal, "Nietzsche's Sting and the Possibility of Cood 
Philology," International Studies in Philosophy, XVI, 71-90, 1984. 
2 Ibid., p. 71. 
3 Wcstphal, "Was Nietzsche A Cognitivist?" Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, XXII, 343-363, Jl 1984. 
4 Ibid., p. 353. 
5 Wcstphal, "Nietzsche's Sling," p. 73. 
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possibility of truth would be involved in a contradiction that vitiates its 
own usefulness as an cpistcmology. And, since consistency seems to be one 
requirement of a successful cognitivist cpistcmology, in order for 
Nietzsche's cpistcmology to function as the necessary ground of his critical 
project his position must be shown to be consistent. Westphal recognizes 
this, and indeed he maintains that his interpretation absolves Nietzsche 
of "epistemic inconsistency."6 
Westphal is not alone in his belief that Nietzsche must be able to 
make truth claims and that he must provide them a ground. A number of 
American Nietzsche scholars have interpreted Nietzsche this way. John 
Wilcox writes: 
Accusing your enemies of ignorance has no point unless you 
believe in the possibility and desirability of knowledge. 
There is no bite to the charge that someone has blinded 
himself to reality unless it is possible to do better-to sec 
reality for what it is. 7 
Arthur Danto makes a similar point: 
In the end, then, he too has his metaphysics and his 
theory as to what- its structure and composition 
ultimately must be There is a crucial tension 
throughout Nietzsche, between free-wheeling critic, 
always prepared to shift ground in attacking 
metaphysics, and a metaphysical philosopher seeking to 
provide a basis for his repudiation of any such enterprise 
as he is practicing.8 
But an alternative to this interpretation that philosophers have failed to 
consider is that Nietzsche sought to undermine the assumption that 
philosophical criticism is legitimate only when it is supported by a theory 
or ;/stem that would provide it an epistemic sanction. In what follows I 
examine Westphal's reading of Nietzsche. After suggesting some criticisms 
of this reading I argue that much of Nietzsche's critique of Western 
philosophy is devoted to attacking assumptions that lay behind 
traditional cpistcmologics, the cognitivist position sketched above being 
one of them. Furthermore, I argue that the advantage of the interpretation 
I am proposing is that it conserves the radical character of Nietzsche's 
* Ibid., p. 74. 
7 John Wilcox, Truth and Value in Nietzsche. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1974, p. 58. 
8 Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1965, p. 80. 
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critical project while squaring with and helping to make sense of his many 
skeptical remarks. Additionally, I suggest how this interpretation helps 
us to recognize that Nietzsche's philosophy docs not succumb to the so-
called "skeptic's paradox." 
Wcstphal's interpretation consists in the following key claims: 
(1) Nietzsche views the world as "a charactcrizable 
though highly transitory realm."9 While the denizens 
of the world arc in flux, this flux is not so radical that it 
does not have particular, intelligible characteristics. 
(2) We have perceptual access to that world via the 
senses.10 
(3) Language is the medium of expression for representing 
what is made available by the senses.11 
(4) The individuals capable of expressing in language 
what is made available by the senses arc skilled 
philologists (identified as Qbermenschen) whose efforts 
arc creative and cognitivist; the kind of creation 
Nietzsche is interested in is the creation of "a vivid, 
accurate, comprehensible representation of a subject 
matter." 1 2 
Nietzsche's position is coherent and consistent. In particular, his position 
is not undercut by a commitment to pcrspectivism.13 
The first question that arises is, why should we believe that (1) 
constitutes the position Nietzsche takes regarding the nature of the world 
if, as Westphal admits, Nietzsche did claim that the world is 
"fundamentally a characterless flux"?'* Wcstphal's argument is that the 
radical flux thesis is untenable and that if it was maintained by, Nietzsche 
it would threaten his own critical project. As Westphal argues, if 
Nietzsche claims that the world is a characterless Hcraclitean flux: 
then no one, not even Nietzsche himself, could be aware 
of the fluctuation. Hence, he could not claim to know 
about it and he could not cite this as a problem for 
language or cognition.15 
9 Westphal, "Nietzsche's Sting" p. 75. 
10 Ibid., p. 76. 
11 Ibid., p. 77. 
1 2 Ibid., p. HI. 
1 3 Ibid., p. 8 4 . 
14 Ibid., p. 74. 
« Ibid. 
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Moreover, if Nietzsche did claim that all he knows about the world is that 
it is a characterless flux: 
then he would put himself in the position for which he 
derides Kant, namely, of knowing just enough about 
reality to know that it is unknowable.16 
The conclusion Wcstphal draws is that wc must accept "a Nictzschean 
middle course between sheer chaotic flux and pure Being."17 
Do wc have perceptual access to the world of (1) via the senses, 
according to Nietzsche? Wcstphal draws on several passages to show that 
Nietzsche's answer is yes, we do: 
All credibility, all good (intcllcctuall conscience, all 
evidence of truth comes only from the senses (BCE 134). 
(The senses) lie neither in the way the Elcatics believed, 
nor as (Hcraclitus) belicvcd-thcy do not lie at all. 
What wc make of their testimony, that alone introduces 
l i e s . . . . "Reason" is the cause of our falsification of the 
testimony of the senses (CM III 2). 
This is a crucial part of Wcstphal's case because according to his 
interpretation Nietzsche spurns transcendent metaphysics while embracing 
empiricism. It is this empiricism, evidenced by the above citations, that 
allows Nietzsche the recognition that the world is a moderate flux while 
providing him the facts upon which his critique of philosophy, religion 
and art is based. These passages indicate that "there is at least room for 
perceptual access to an empirical realm according to the late Nietzsche."18 
Taken together these passages lead Wcstphal to conclude that in his 
mature efforts Nietzsche absolves the senses of bias, thereby allowing 
them to function as the inlets of veracious information concerning the world. 
But wc cannot establish that Nietzsche held a correspondence theory 
of truth solely by pointing out his confidence in the senses, for the 
information they provide can be useful in this regard only if there is some 
means by which this information can be utilized. Surprisingly, Wcstphal 
identifies language as the means by which Nietzsche believed it possible 
to make use of the data of sensation: 
Is language capable of expressing or representing what is 
made available by the senses? Against all interpreters 
1* Ibid., p. 75. 
17 Ibid., p. 84. 
1 8 Ibid., p. 76. But sec GS 372 and BCE 192 for a different perspective on the 
testimony of the senses. 
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who have foundered on the problem of language in 
Nietzsche, it must be noted that in fact Nietzsche did 
think it possible to 'speak straight to all things.'1 9 
Westphal argues that Qbermenschen, whom he identifies as skilled 
philologists of the future, will in Nietzsche's opinion overcome the 
dissimulativc tendencies of ordinary language and thus become adept at 
describing the empirical realm. That Nietzsche considered language to be 
a possible means of reliable expression is evidenced, in Wcstphal's view, 
by the following passages taken from Zarathustra: 
Here all things come caressingly to your discourse 
and flatter you . . . . On every parable you ride to every1 
truth. 
Here you may talk fairly and frankly to all things: 
and verily, it rings in their ears like praise when 
somebody talks straight to all things. 
Here the words and word-shrines of all being open up 
before me: here all being wishes to become word, all 
becoming wishes to learn from me how to speak (Z. ///, 
Return Home). 
This point is being stressed again in the following passage "in more 
conceptual, cpistcmological terms," according to Westphal: 
In a dream, in the last dream of the morning, I stood ' 
in the foothills today-beyond the world, held scales, 
and weighed the world 
Measurable by him who has time, weighable by a 
good weigher, reachable by strong wings; guessablc by 
divine nutcrackers: thus my dream found the world. 
How surely my dream looked upon this finite world, 
not inquisitively, not acquisitively, not afraid, not 
begging, as if a full apple offered itself to my hand . . . as ; 
if delicate hands carried a shrine toward me, a shrine , 
open for the delight of bashful, adoring eyes, thus the 
world offered itself to me today; not riddle enough to 
frighten away human love, not solution enough to put to 
sleep human wisdom: a humanly good thing the world 
was to me today, though one speaks so much evil of it (Z 
///, Three Evils). 
i 
1 9 ibid., p. 77. 
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Finally, Wcstphal believes that the possibility of eliminating 
linguistic inadequacy is indicated in the following passage, where 
Zarathustra says 
I flew . . . away into distant futures which no dream had 
yet seen, into hotter souths than artists ever dreamed of, 
where gods in their dances are ashamed of all clothes—to 
speak in parables and to limp and stammer like poets; 
and, verily, I am ashamed that I must still be a poet 
(Z ///, Tablets 2). 
The type of truth Wcstphal thinks the Ubermenschen will be capable 
of creating will be "a vivid, accurate, comprehensible representation of the 
main features of a subject matter."20 Yet this will be a somewhat open-
ended or perspectival representation, for there can be different 
perspectives on a given subject, depending on which features arc 
represented. As Wcstphal argues, 
Cognitivism docs not require complete knowledge of an 
object. Though Nietzsche's perspectivism is cognitivist, 
this does not mean that there is any single, completely 
correct, "beatific" interpretation of anything. Rather, 
the point of view involved in perspectival cognition 
seems to entail a radical incompleteness and, due to this, 
and open-ended rcvisability of interpretations.21 
Wcstphal goes on to suggest that the cognitive strength of a particular 
perspective derives from the employment of varieties of perspectives used 
to view a given subject matter, and this strength amounts to a limited 
objectivity. Nietzsche's philologist, while capable of grasping and 
communicating how things are, docs not do so omniscicntly. As one can sec, 
Westphal is attempting, very cleverly I might add, to locate Nietzsche's 
perspectivism within the context of a cognitivism that is cpistcmically 
strong enough to vouchsafe the integrity of both that perspectivism and his 
critique of Western philosophy, religion and culture. That this is the 
notion of objectivity that is recommended by Nietzsche, and that this 
notion is consistent with Nietzsche's perspectivism is substantiated by the 
following quotation: 
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective 
"knowing"; and the more affects wc allow to speak about 
one thing, the more eyes, and different eyes, we can use to 
2° Ibid.t p. 81. 
2' Ibid. 
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observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of 
this thing, our "objectivity," be (CM 111 32). 
At this point I would like to suggest some criticisms of the case 
Westphal makes for reading Nietzsche as a cognitivist, beginning with his 
argument for (1), the "moderate flux" thesis. His argument, at least as I 
understand it, is simply that without an epistemic foundation Nietzsche's 
critical project must come crashing down and that (1) would be a necessary 
component of that foundation. But this docs not establish that Nietzsche 
was committed to (1). On the contrary, the most that Westphal can have 
shown is that Nietzsche's position requires something like (1), and not that 
it actually includes it. That the coherence of Nietzsche's views demands a 
particular claim would not be sufficient evidence for attributing that claim 
to Nietzsche. It might be the case, after all, that Nietzsche is involved in 
a fundamental inconsistency. And since one of Westphal's goals is to 
absolve Nietzsche of epistemic inconsistency, the threat of this cannot be 
taken as evidence for attributing to him any determinate position. What 
would be helpful is textual evidence that establishes Nietzsche's 
commitment to (1), but I am unaware of any passages in which Nietzsche 
suggests that the world is 'a charactcrizable though highly transitory 
realm.' But even if one were to find a passage of this kind, one might still 
be at a loss to account for those where Nietzsche is apparently committed 
to the radical flux thesis. 
Furthermore, the passages from Zarathustra that Westphal cites 
cannot be interpreted as evidence suggesting Nietzsche's belief in the 
possibility and desirability of veracious, non-metaphorical referential 
language. The first one ('on every parable you ride to every truth') is 
viewed by Westphal as an expression of Nietzsche's belief that it is 
possible to 'speak straight to things,' i.e. that language will be capable of 
representing adequately the testimony of the senses. The third passage i_ 
taken to indicate that this possibility will be actualized in a distant future 
imagined by Zarathustra, who laments i am ashamed that I must still be a 
poet' because (on Westphal's view) of Zarathustra's own reliance on 
metaphorical language. But in the first passage Zarathustra's solitude 
seems to claim not only the possibility of veracious language, but the 
actuality as well. It appears to indicate the possession of this facility. In 
any event the use of parabolic language is praised, for it is on parables that 
Zarathustra 'rides to every truth.' Later, in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche refers to 
this passage: 
The involuntary nature of image, of metaphor is the most 
remarkable thing of all; one no longer has any idea what 
is image, what metaphor, everything presents itself as 
the readiest, the truest, the simplest means of expression. 
It really does seem to allude to a saying of Zarathustra's, 
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as if the things themselves approached and offered 
themselves as metaphors (here all things come 
caressingly to your discourse and flatter you , . . ) ( £ // 
Zarathustra 3) 
Instead of lamenting the awkward and ineffectual character of 
metaphorical expression, as one would expect given Wcstphal's 
interpretation, Nietzsche is apparently celebrating the inspiration that 
has given rise to that sort of expression. And while these lines cannot be 
understood properly until one comes to terms with what is meant by 'the 
truest, the simplest means of expression,' prima facie they seem 
inconsistent with the belief that Nietzsche viewed tropological language 
as inherently flawed and inevitably futile and that he longed for the non-
metaphorical expression of experience. 
Without appropriate epistemic support, Wcstphal claims, 
Nietzsche's criticisms arc groundless, and his otherwise insightful 
critiques become little more than the shrill ravings of an ill-tempered 
crank. However, I believe that at least part of what makes Nietzsche's 
thought genuinely revolutionary is his questioning of the need for, the 
possibility of, and the motivation behind the very sort of epistemic ground 
that Wcstphal sees as an indispensable element of Nietzsche's 
philosophy. To put the matter a little differently, what Wcstphal's 
interpretation misses is Nietzsche's multivalent attack on the role that 
truth has traditionally been assigned within philosophy. 
Why should we think that the value of Nietzsche's critical project 
hinges on whether an epistemic ground is available for it? To claim that 
the usefulness or the appropriateness of philosophical thought is 
ultimately determined by the availability of such a ground is to make an 
assumption that Nietzsche wanted to question. For in a number of passages 
located in his mature works Nietzsche proposes to question the faith all 
philosophers have shared in the value of truth. This is part of what I 
would call Nietzsche's critique of epistcmology, a critique that consists in a 
collection of suggestions that challenge the idea of a philosopher as an 
individual who knows in advance of practice what values and drives 
motivate that practice, and who knows the propriety of those values and 
drives and what ends they ought to serve. An example of this critique can 
be found at the beginning of Beyond Good And Evil, where Nietzsche 
writes: 
The will to truth which will still tempt us to many a 
venture, that famous truthfulness of which all 
philosophers have spoken with respect-what questions 
has this will to truth not laid before us! What strange, 
wicked, questionable questions! That is a long story even 
now-and yet it seems as if it had scarcely begun. Is it any 
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wonder that we should finally become suspicious, lose 
patience, and turn away impatiently? that we should 
finally learn from this Sphinx to ask questions, too? Who 
is it really that puts questions to us here? What in us 
really wants "truth"? 
Indeed we came to a long halt at the question about 
the cause of this will—until we finally came to a 
complete stop before a still more basic question. We 
asked about the value of this will. Suppose we want 
truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? evenj 
ignorance? (BGE 7; cf. BCE 34). 
When confronted with the above quotation Wcstphal's reaction might be 
to insist that Nietzsche has in mind here philosophers who indulge in 
transcendent metaphysics and who would, unlike Ubermenschen, insist on 
the absolute truth of their (in actuality) other-worldly metaphysical 
theories. But it docs not seem obvious to mc that these questions would be 
limited in this way, and that they could not be asked of those whose 
project would be the creation of "a vivid, accurate, comprehensible 
representation of the main features of a subject matter." After all, 
supposing that for Nietzsche truth of this kind is possible, couldn't wc ask: 
why shouldn't wc prefer untruth, uncertainty, or even ignorance? This 
question seems appropriate if only because Nietzsche wants to undermine 
the unquestioned importance philosophers have ascribed to the project of 
attaining a clear understanding of things. This is what he is doing in the 
following passage, one that recalls his enthusiasm for ambiguity, enigma 
and mystery: 
A matter that becomes clear ceases to concern us.—What 
was on the mind of that god who counseled: "Know 
thyself?" Did he mean: "Cease to concern yourself! 
Become objcctivc!"-And Socrates? And "scientific men"? 
(BGE 80; cf.CS 357). 
That Nietzsche questioned the value that has been placed on truth by 
all philosophers, and that he seemed pessimistic that this value could 
find any justification is further evidenced by the following passage, taken 
from The Genealogy of Morals: 
Merc let us pause and take thought. It appears that 
today inquiry \Wissenschafl\ itself stands in need of 
justification (by which I do not mean to say that such ; 
justification can be found). In this connection let us glance , 
at both the oldest and the most recent philosophers: to a 
man they lack all awareness that the will to truth itself 
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needs to be justified. There is a gap here in every 
philosophy—how arc wc to explain it? By the fact that 
the ascetic ideal has so far governed all philosophy; 
that truth was premised as Being, as Cod, as supreme 
sanction; that truth was not allowed to be called into 
question. But once wc withhold our faith from the god of 
the ascetic ideal a new problem poses itself, the problem 
of the value of truth. The will to truth must be 
scrutinized; our business now is tentatively to question the 
will to truth (CM 111 24). 
A passage like this one is challenging in a number of ways. First it may be 
asked what sort of "truth" Nietzsche has in mind here. Presumably 
commentators who feel it necessary to attribute to Nietzsche some 
substantive theoretical claims concerning knowledge would endeavor to 
restrict the sense of truth in passages like this one to that of metaphysical 
truth, i.e. truth of the sort to which philosophers like Parmenidcs, Plato 
and Descartes aspired. But that Nietzsche is not restricting his criticism to 
philosophers who attempt to construct ambitious metaphysical theories, 
and that it docs apply to any philosopher who has assumed truth's 
unparalleled value, whether empirical or otherwise, is borne out by the 
inclusivcness of the above passage ("the oldest and most recent 
philosophers: to a man . . .") and by the inclusion of atheists and 
antimetaphysicians in his criticism of the unrcflcctivc acceptance of the 
ascetic ideal in the lines directly preceding this quotation.22 
But if his critique is unrestricted in this manner a second problem 
arises: How could Nietzsche be questioning so comprehensively the role of 
truth in philosophy? For if he is suggesting that the will to truth be 
scrutinized he must be interested in understanding the role of truth in 
philosophy, and that means he is interested in getting something right 
2 2 These proud solitaries, absolutely intransigent in their insistence on 
intellectual precision, these hard, strict, continent, heroic minds, all these 
wan atheists, Antichrists, immoralists, nihilists, sceptics, suspenders of 
judgment, embodying whatever remained of intellectual conscience today-
arc they really as free from the ascetic ideal as they imagine themselves 
to be? I would tell them something which they cannot sec because they arc 
too close to themselves: it is they, precisely, who today represent the 
ascetic ideal; it is they who are its most subtle exponents, its scouts and 
advance guard, its most dangerous and elusive temptation . . . . These men 
arc a long way from being free spirits, because they still believe in truth . . . 
." (CM III 24; Sec also BCE 3 and CS 347). It is difficult to see how this 
passage could be interpreted as being concerned with only one notion of 
truth, e.g. metaphysical truth. The word translated above as "truth" is 
Wahrheit. 
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about philosophy. And, wouldn't this locate him within the very 
tradition he intends to challenge? 
This is the "skeptic's paradox" I mentioned earlier. It is meant to 
compromise Nietzsche's thought by showing him to be making unfairly an 
exception in his own case. It can be answered by pointing out that taking an 
interest in the role of truth in philosophy, and indeed wanting to know the 
justification accorded it and doubting whether any justification can be found 
can be done without contradiction. All that Nietzsche need avoid is 
placing the value on truth that he presumably wants to challenge. What 
this means is that Nietzsche must avoid philosophizing in such a way 
that he makes truth a necessary or final arbiter within his own 
philosophy. This would include refraining from assenting to the need for 
an epistemic or metaphysical ground for his philosophy. This would be 
contradictory, for it would locate him squarely within the tradition that 
he finds at bottom gratuitous. 
This leads to a third difficulty, and it is one that is related to 
Wcstphal's problematic: how can Nietzsche attack Western philosophy 
and the value it has placed on truth without making truth claims that 
would compromise the integrity of his attack? That is, how is it possible 
for Nietzsche to question the goals and assumptions of an cpistcmology 
that is for example within the Cartesian tradition without employing a 
rival notion of truth that would have enough epistemic muscle to present a 
formidable challenge to an epistcmology of this kind? And if Nietzsche's 
attack did rely on and draw strength from an alternative conception of 
truth then he would be susceptible to the very objection that he raises 
against all the philosophers who have followed in the ascetic tradition, 
viz. making truth the ultimate sanction in philosophy. 
I think that this line of questioning, which has received a fair amount 
of attention in recent Nietzsche scholarship, involves a misunderstanding 
of Nietzsche's attitude toward theories of knowledge. In particular, it 
assumes that for Nietzsche, as well as for anybody, epistcmology must be 
philosophically primitive. I say this because its chief assumption is that 
a theory of knowledge can only be challenged by a rival theory. It assumes 
that epistcmology, or any other philosophical perspective, can only be 
assailed by an argument that commits itself at some level to beliefs about 
the nature of truth and knowledge. But this assumption makes an unfair 
demand on Nietzsche while missing the revolutionary character of his 
thought, for Nietzsche questions not only the viability of epistcmology but 
its authority and usefulness as well. 
Consider the following quotation in which Nietzsche criticizes 
materialistic natural scientists, a criticism that, it seems to me, would 
apply to the project Westphal has in mind for Nietzsche's Ubermenschen: 
"Above all, one should not wish to divest existence of its rich ambiguity: 
that is a dictate of good taste, gentlemen, the taste for reverence for 
everything that lies beyond your horizon." (CS 373) In this quotation 
12 AUSLEGUNG 
Nietzsche is criticizing a form of world interpretation that while different 
from the one attributed by Wcstphal to Nietzsche's Qbermenschen is also 
empirically oriented. His criticism is motivated by standards that are not, 
so to speak, immanent to those one would normally associate with projects 
whose goal is a clear, accurate portrayal of the world. As is typical of this 
type of criticism, a project is attacked from a perspective that is foreign to 
it, from one that docs not take truth as the only or the ultimate standard. 
Specifically, what Nietzsche is questioning is whether the natural 
scientists' efforts emanate from a reverential attitude toward existence. 
And part of the motivation behind this kind of critique is to get us to 
rethink our philosophical priorities, one of which is the often claimed but 
seldom justified priority placed on truth. 
The following quotation is another example of what I would call 
Nietzsche's moral critique of truth in philosophy. Having defined the 
will to truth as the will not to deceive or be deceived, Nietzsche goes on to 
write: 
One docs not want to allow oneself to be deceived because 
one assumes that it is harmful, dangerous, calamitous to 
be deceived. In this sense, science would be a long-range 
prudence, a caution, a utility; but one can object in all 
fairness: How is that? Is wanting not to allow oneself to 
be deceived really less harmful, less dangerous, less 
calamitous? What do you know in advance of the 
character of existence to be able to decide whether the 
greater advantage is on the side of the unconditionally 
mistrustful or of the unconditionally trusting? (GS 344). 
In this passage Nietzsche is contesting one of the more widespread 
presuppositions that has influenced the manner in which philosophers 
have understood questions concerning knowledge and reality. This is the 
view that such questions ought to be raised independently of any other 
concerns, or that any competing concerns arc already recognized along with 
their relation to epistcmology. Philosophers have believed themselves to 
possess, in advance of investigation, an understanding of the proper 
hierarchy of speculation, positing as most fundamental questions concerning 
the nature of truth. The problem of objectivity is seen as arising only after 
the initial epistemic act, only after the question "what is truth?" has been 
raised, and it then becomes a matter of safeguarding against influences that 
would usurp the authority of this question or that would contaminate 
attempts at providing it an answer. Thus the question "what is truth?" is 
understood as one that can only be approached in a vacuum, so to spook, or 
in an environment cleansed of whatever might be alien to or in defiance of 
the authority of this question. Wcstphal's interpretation of Nietzsche's 
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philosophy is one that is committed to this view of the hierarchy of 
philosophical speculation. 
There emerges along with this a view of the philosopher who is seen 
as an individual in whom whatever passions, attachments or interests that 
might be antagonistic towards the pursuit of truth have been vanquished. 
Generally, Nietzsche considers the traditional conception of the 
philosopher to be dominated by an ascetic ideal in which the needs for 
certainty, clarity and a foundation for beliefs arc unquestioned. The 
"objectivity" presumed by philosophers has led them to view the 
valuations that comprise this ideal-clarity, coherence, fidelity to fact 
and freedom from deception, to name a few—as requirements of their 
practice instead of as assumptions whose merits may be called into 
question. Thus the ascetic ideal and the faith in the autonomy and 
primacy of traditional cpistemology have proven to be obstacles to 
speculation rather than its necessary assumptions and components. That is 
to say, Nietzsche views the objectivity claimed by philosophers to have 
been an immense prejudice that would require, and should not be assumed to 
determine, the nature of philosophical justification. But as we have seen, 
this docs not mean that he was at all optimistic that a justification could 
be given. ( 
Nietzsche criticizes the epistemic constituent of the ascetic ideal by 
using its own standards to reveal that the demand for a ground is groundless 
or that the requirement of certainty is an uncertain one. He is, one might 
say, simply giving that which is falling a push. In this respect part of his 
critique of cpistcmology is carried on within the domain of epistcmology. 
But this is not the case with other aspects of his critique, most notably his 
speculations concerning the origin and development of our faith in and our 
need for explanation, knowledge and for convictions that we can be assured 
arc true. This investigation is carried out beyond or outside of the domain 
of theory of knowledge, and it contains many of the critical "stings" that, if 
Westphal were right, would require an epistemic ground so that they could 
be known to be true. But it is precisely this need that Nietzsche is 
questioning: 
Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for 
the familiar, the will to uncover under everything 
strange, unusual, and questionable something that no 
longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us 
to know? And is the jubilation of those who attain 
knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a 
sense of security? (GS 355). 
The demand for certainty is likewise questioned in the following passage: 
14 AUSLEGUNG 
Metaphysics is still needed by some; but so is that 
impetuous demand for certainty that today discharges 
itself among large numbers of people in a scientific-
positivistic form. The demand that one wants by all 
means that something should be firm (while on account of 
the ardor of this demand one is easier and more negligent 
about the demonstration of this certainty)-this, too, is 
still the demand for a support, a prop, in short, that 
instinct of weakness which, to be sure, docs not create 
religious, metaphysical systems, and convictions of all 
kinds but-conscrves them (GS 347). 
Passages like this one, in which the need for secured convictions is 
questioned, can be found in all of Nietzsche's mature works. 2 3 To ask 
whether they are true or whether there is an epistemic ground available 
for them is itself a misunderstanding of them, for it is this need that 
Nietzsche questions. And if, as I have argued, Nietzsche's philosophy is 
beyond traditional epistcmology, attempts at providing his criticisms of 
Western religion, philosophy and culture a theoretical base that reflects 
the standards of traditions he found questionable is to miss one of the most 
radical aspects of his thought. 
Finally, I should point out that none of this is opposed to Nietzsche's 
view of himself as a lover of knowledge or as a friend of truth. This may be 
understood as an expression of confidence in his own intellectual integrity 
and honesty. Possessing an intellectual conscience is for Nietzsche a matter 
of resisting the various fears, passions, weaknesses and desires that may 
tempt a philosopher to find gratification or take refuge in convictions or 
systems of belief.24 This requires, among other things, courage, hardness 
and cruelty towards oneself, the ability to view something from a variety 
of perspectives while not remaining in one perspective, and per hap above 
all strength and freedom of spirit. Perhaps one must be like Zarathustra, 
whom Nietzsche said "is more truthful than any other thinker."2* Out of 
Zarathustra Nietzsche also wrote the following: 
One should not let oneself be misled: great intellects are 
sceptics. Zarathustra is a sceptic. The vigor of mind, its 
freedom through strength and superior strength, is proved 
by scepticism. Men of conviction simply do not come into 
consideration where the fundamentals of value and 
2 3 For example, sec Twilight of the Idols, 'The Four Crcat Errors" 5, 
"Expeditions of an Untimely Man," 26; CS 370; A 55. 
2 4 'The will to a system is a lack of integrity," TI "Maxims and Arrows," 
26. 
» EH "Why I Am A Destiny," 3. 
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disvaluc arc concerned. Convictions arc prisons. They do 
not see far enough, they do not sec things beneath them: 
but to be permitted to speak about value and disvaluc one 
must see five hundred convictions beneath one~behind 
one . . . . A spirit which wants to do great things, which 
also wills the means for it, is necessarily a sceptic. 
Freedom from convictions of any kind, the capacity for an 
unconstrained view, pertains to strength . . . . (A 54). 
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